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Making a Choice or Taking a Stand?   
Choice Feminism, Political Engagement, and the Contemporary Feminist Movement 
 Rachel Thwaites 
 
Abstract: Choice feminism is a popular form of contemporary feminism, encouraging women to 
embrace the opportunities they have in life and to see the choices they make as justified and 
always politically acceptable.  Though this kind of feminism appears at first glance to be tolerant 
and inspiring, its narratives also bring about a political stagnation as discussion, debate, and 
critical judgment of the actions of others are discouraged in the face of being deemed 
unsupportive and a ‘bad’ feminist.  Choice feminism also encourages neoliberal values of 
individualism and consumerism, while downplaying the need for political and collective action 
against systematic inequalities.  Yet to succeed in creating change for women debate needs to 
occur, and all decisions cannot be supported if they act to further inequality and a patriarchal 
status quo.  In this article I would like to argue for the continued need to engage politically with 
other feminists and the status of the movement as a whole by critiquing choice feminism and 
looking empirically at how discussion and dissent can be silenced by the choice narrative.  The 
empirical data in this article will focus on online discussions of naming on marriage to illustrate 
the wider theoretical argument.   
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The popular (non-academic), positive image of feminism is of a movement which protests for 
more choice for women in their daily lives: more opportunities, more freedom; less restraint and 
less constricted roles to play.  This is an image that could be associated with any ‘wave’ of 
feminism, but has perhaps become most connected with the ‘third wave’, beginning in the 1990s. 
In this popular idea and narrative of feminism ‘choice’ is the most significant word.  Women can 
choose to work or stay at home, choose to marry or not, have children or not; choices are to be 
made freely as the world becomes a more equal place.  This kind of feminism sounds inspiring, 
welcoming, and positive.  Claire Snyder has argued that Third Wave Feminism, from which 
choice feminism grew, is intended to be more inclusive and diverse (2008: 180).  This is in part 
to deal with some of the perceived problems of the second-wave in dealing with the complexities 
of the category ‘woman’; this wave has rejected ‘grand narratives’ and looks to personal 
perspective and locatedness (Snyder, 2008: 175).  However, as liberatory and tolerant as choice 
feminism initially sounds it has drawbacks which get to the heart of the question of what 
feminism is for (Thornton, 2010)1.  These drawbacks are highlighted by feminists who critique 
the narratives of choice feminism. Indeed, some have been critical of the genuine inclusiveness 
of Third Wave feminism (Springer, 2002), casting doubt upon the idea that the choice narrative 
allows everyone to follow their own desires and wishes within the modern feminist movement.   
 
The question of what to do with one’s last name on marriage has long been associated with the 
Western feminist movement.  In the United States, Lucy Stone was the first American woman 
known to have retained her birth name after marriage.  She was a nineteenth-century abolitionist 
and suffragist and her act has sparked the ‘Lucy Stone League’, which continues to campaign for 
neutral naming practices in the United States.  Definite, documentary connections to the British 
                                                          
1
 As Thornton argues in her 2010 article, when looking at the context of ‘an incident involving the 
representation of women's breasts on the cover of an Australian law school student magazine, which included 
short articles on sexed crime’, de-politicising feminist activity and using ‘irony’ and ‘humour’ as excuses to 
objectify women, under the guise of third wave feminism, empowerment, and choice, can have detrimental 
effects for people’s understanding of what feminism’s aims are and actually for the position of women within 
that context. 
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Women’s Movement are harder to find, yet despite this, the connection with the second wave of 
feminism is strong in the popular imagination: the decision to retain one’s last name after 
marriage is therefore seen as, it least potentially, a feminist act. The practice of name changing 
has been connected by feminists with a patriarchal culture which views women as second-class 
citizens. The naming practice in the UK has grown from diverse practices across the four nations 
which make up the country to converge with the long-standing English practice of women 
changing their names to those of their husbands when they marry (Thwaites, 2013a).  This 
practice in England was connected with coverture, a legal state women entered after marriage in 
which they were ‘under’ their husband’s protection and were not separate individuals. Carol 
Pateman has described this as the woman being ‘civilly dead’ (1988: 119), unable to make 
contracts, hold (most kinds of) property, or testify against her husband in court as they were seen 
as one and the same. Though there were exceptions, (see, for example, Finn, 1996) the idea that 
husbands and wives were one in law, with the man as the more important of the pair, was 
signified through the shared last name.  This tradition and its connotations, as well as lived 
consequences for real lives, are what feminists have reacted against, viewing the retaining of 
one’s name as an act against the patriarchal culture.  Hence, name retaining could be seen as an 
expected or ‘standard’ feminist act. 
 
In this article I examine choice feminism and how it influences discussions of decision-making in 
women’s lives through a set of empirical evidence taken from a small study of feminist bridal 
websites.  This will focus on the discussions around name changing and retaining on marriage 
and how ‘choice’ becomes a part of maintaining the neoliberal status quo. As academic feminists 
debate the narrative of choice and its negative and anti-equality connections to neoliberalism, 
popular feminism continues to chart a course of celebrating and using choice as a means to live a 
feminist life.  The divide between these feminist narratives needs to be bridged to have a more 
open discussion about what feminism means and how choice fits into it: without this we run the 
risk of seeing it become increasingly difficult to make political statements for women and 
becoming something which does not translate across academic and popular lines.  In this article I 
engage with academic critiques of choice feminism, before looking at the set of empirical data 
and discussing what this means for how contemporary feminism is understood by those defining 
as feminist, and finally why choice feminism needs to be challenged if the movement is to remain 
politically engaged and useful to creating change. 
 
Critiquing Choice  
 
Choice feminism is often associated with authors like Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards 
(2000), who understand every decision a woman makes as potentially feminist, if given thought 
and made with a political consciousness.  Authors such as Natasha Walter have also written 
highly popular books, based on choice feminism (Walter, 1999; though Walter has since 
distanced herself from this stance2, see Walter, 2010).  It was Linda Hirshman (2006) who coined 
the phrase ‘choice feminism’ and gave it a pejorative slant, criticising the lack of political thought 
that went into these choices. In her typically polemical style Hirshman wrote that ‘[a] movement 
that stands for everything ultimately stands for nothing’ (2006: 2).  Michaele Ferguson is another 
strong opponent of choice feminism, arguing that judgement is needed to truly live a feminist 
politics and that all choices are not equal (Ferguson, 2010: 251).  She argues clearly that 
judgements may be difficult to make – especially judgements of the lives of loved ones – but that 
this does not mean they should not be made (Ferguson, 2010: 249).  She argues instead that the 
                                                          
2
 Natasha Walter writes in her 2010 book, Living Dolls, that she feels she was over-confident about the gains 
women had made in The New Feminism. She writes that she failed to understand how pervasive and 
detrimental the sexualisation and objectification of girls and women really was and that it has only increased 
and intensified over the 2000s. 
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only way to genuinely improve our world is to make these judgements and to not allow fears of 
upsetting or alienating people to prevent us from actively engaging in politics in the everyday:  ‘if 
we suspend judgement in the context of our personal relationships, we seem to be failing in 
courage as feminists – for feminism is precisely about reimagining and reworking the personal’ 
(Ferguson, 2010: 249).  It is this point about judgement which is so critical to discussions of 
choice feminism and its worth.  When we allow every choice to be equal there is no capacity to 
argue against one form of action and decision-making over another.  
 
Choice feminism certainly opens up a number of critical questions around whether feminism’s 
main focus should be on the individual and their decisions or on the collective and the best 
decisions for all.  Jannet Kirkpatrick states (2010: 242) that choice feminists are interested in 
getting away from the negative judgement of feminism and in remembering that only each 
individual woman can really know her own circumstances and reasons for acting as she does.  
There can be no ‘standard feminist’ actions, but only individual choices based on what is best for 
that person and her life; the worst thing a feminist could do is restrain her fellows in making 
these choices (Kirkpatrick, 2010: 242).  For choice feminists, Kirkpatrick argues (2010: 243) 
feminism is always here, and the movement’s gains are simply part of the fabric of life.  Instead 
of seeing feminism as an ongoing battle with the possibility of regression and the restriction of 
rights and hard won freedoms, choice feminists see it as ‘in the water’ (Kirkpatrick, 2010: 242).  
Hirschmann has claimed that this harms the feminist movement itself and those holding this 
viewpoint should be taken to task (see Hirschmann, 2006). Lori Marso also points out that 
having diverse desires is a part of politics and debate is key to maintaining a political stance 
(Marso, 2010: 263).  The fact then, that people have different viewpoints, desires, and challenges 
in their life does not mean the demise of the movement: ‘we can retain feminist community 
while also retaining diversity’ (Marso, 2010: 264).  Embracing the fact there are differences 
between women and that intersections create difference, does not also mean that all 
commonalities are washed away or that women cannot work to understand one another’s 
situations and work together through these differences.  As Susan Friedman argues (1993: 250), 
we have to make political statements about ‘women’ to make any political progress and we can 
do this without pretending there is a united sisterhood.  There have always been different and 
competing desires within feminism, as within most political movements3.  Being a woman does 
set up socially constructed ways of relating to the world and the world relating to you (Marso, 
2010: 266).  It is recognising these and speaking across commonalities which women can do. 
Instead of falling on an individualistic choice rhetoric, which removes the chance to debate, 
critique, and do politics, we can work together through challenge, discussion, and considered 
judgement. 
 
This academic feminist criticism of the feminist choice narrative suggests a divide between 
popular conceptions of feminism and academic ones.  The danger of not bridging the gap 
between these discussions will become clear below. I am not suggesting non-academic feminists 
are unable to think without academic feminists – or indeed that non-academic feminists never 
turn to and use popular narratives themselves - but that there is a strong choice rhetoric in 
popular feminism, which helps to make living a feminist life-politics easier in a complex world 
(one which academic feminists will also turn to and use); however, this also allows feminists to 
refuse to take responsibility for difficult judgements, in Ferguson’s terms, and it is this which is 
critiqued by academic feminists. Choice within feminism is a very difficult concept to reconcile 
with the wider emancipatory, communal project and I am not providing a definitive answer to it 
here.  However, there are more or less traditional choices which impact on unequally gendered 
relations and are linked to patriarchal pasts and futures. Instead of justifying these choices and 
                                                          
3
 I see this as a sign of vibrancy and passion, responding to complex concerns. 
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silencing any critique of them, feminists should be prepared to discuss and critique the context 
within which they make their life decisions. Of course feminists will make a variety of choices 
about their lives, and not always in the best interests of women as a whole or the wider feminist 
movement, but the reality of this fact should not be hidden away behind the word ‘choice’.  
Instead, feminists have a responsibility to look carefully at their own and others’ decisions and 
the reasons for which they made them; in so doing, feminists will be able to critically examine 
and debate what it means to be feminist and what courses of action are better for women as a 
whole than others. It is important to take responsibility for one’s actions, but equally significant 
to interrogate and challenge the structural and institutional factors which contribute to them, 
instead of allowing an unhelpful individualism to take hold.  This will ensure feminism is not a 
movement of individual blame, but a collective force for change.   
 
 
Details of the Study: methodology and analysis 
 
The wider study which this data was situated within looked at what British women do with their 
last names when they marry, and their sense of identity in connection with this decision.  I 
administered an online survey, which 102 women completed, and conducted 16 in-depth 
interviews to capture participant experiences of name changing or retaining, their narratives of 
self, and their thoughts and feelings around the norm of name changing more generally, as well 
as how their name connected with family, sexuality, feminism, ideas of tradition, and love (please 
see Thwaites, 2013b for more on the wider study).  In this article I focus on a smaller section of 
work I did within my wider study: looking at the articles and following comment discussions on 
feminist bride websites in relation to name changing.  Though this was not the main focus of my 
study and hence a small selection of feminist bride websites were examined, the discussions 
which occurred on these platforms are indicative of wider popular feminist discussions of choice 
and bring useful insight through use of the words of women themselves.  These websites are 
spaces which are accepted by users to be populated by feminists and so allow people to openly 
discuss their feminist life politics without too much fear of rejection or ridicule; they can 
truthfully share their life decisions and the complexities of coming to them.  This makes them a 
good  source of information on how women relate to feminism in their everyday life. 
 
The websites I surveyed were The Feminist Bride (www.TheFeministBride.com), which was set up 
in 2011, Feminist Wedding (www.feministwedding.com), which was set up in 2009, and A Practical 
Wedding (www.APracticalWedding.com), which was set up in 2008 (I also looked at Feminist Bride 
(www.feministbride.com) and The Offbeat Bride (www.offbeatbride.com) for background reading, 
but my comments come from the first three websites).  The Feminist Bride describes itself as a 
source for ‘modern brides’ to investigate ‘substantive questions’ around weddings and wedding 
traditions, to enjoy their wedding but feel it is a space of equality.  The editor is Katrina Majkut, 
who used to work in investments before moving towards writing, via industry analysis of the 
wedding industry; she describes herself as a ‘proud feminist’. It has a magazine style but offers 
lectures on wedding traditions and information on rights on marriage. The editor/author 
believes there are certain wedding traditions not worth following (name changing is one of 
them), but she wants to the space to be for debate.  Feminist Wedding is run by Casey and is a blog 
of her thoughts on weddings. She provides little information about herself, but follows a number 
of feminist blogs and has given her blog the tagline ‘tradition disrupted. A feminist perspective 
on weddings’.  Her blog revisits naming a few times, describing some of the pitfalls of doing so, 
such as losing track of people, and is generally highly negative about the practice.  A Practical 
Wedding is a website for ‘modern wedding planning’ and allows anyone to submit posts – 
moderated and discussed with editors – about wedding planning. The website is not specifically 
about feminist weddings but includes posts on breaking with tradition and how to have a more 
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‘modern’ wedding, which can include references to more equal weddings.  Judging by the entries 
which are specifically feminist and the comments, this website does attract women who define as 
feminist as at least part of its readership.  None of these websites provide any explicit definition 
of feminism. 
 
As these websites are openly public no ethical approval was sought to use the words of the 
women, however I will synthesise opinions given in comments rather than single people out, 
except for the authors of articles who would appear to have given their consent to their words 
being used in the public domain by presenting their words and videos alongside their name, in a 
similar way to new journalists.  I searched these websites for articles relating to names and 
decisions about them when marrying, looking specifically at what a feminist community was 
saying about this decision.  Through reading these articles and studying the comments and 
discussion which followed I was able to draw out recurring themes.  The most significant theme 
of all was that of choice and how it should be a woman’s free decision what she does with her 
name; some added caveats, such as having carefully thought about the decision beforehand and 
in this way echoed the writings of Baumgardner and Richards (2000), which will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
The women writing on these websites attempt to question the norms of marriage and the 
amount of money involved in the wedding industry, but there are conflicting and conflicted 
discussions of whether or not a feminist can change her name. Meg Keene, writing for 
www.APracticalWedding.com, offers up the viewpoint that a name can be changed to a 
husband’s after a period of thought and when that decision feels ‘right’ to the woman (Keene, 
12th September 2012).  She argues that any decision can be a feminist one if enough time is given 
to considering it, rather than acting unthinkingly.  Keene reasons than sharing a name builds a 
sense of being a team or unit 4 . Keene’s argument aligns very closely in this sense with 
Baumgardner and Richards (2000) about what being a choice feminist means.  The thinking that 
could be done and its connection with feminism is rather less clear though: is Keene thinking 
about the historical and contemporary meanings of name changing, about the aesthetics of her 
name, or the thoughts and feelings of family, friends, and society?  Each of these areas of 
thought I have suggested have gendered norms of action which can lead one to act in a particular 
way; no decision is completely freely made. The underlying position in this article and the 
following discussion in the comments section, which is very much in favour of Keene’s 
philosophy, is that any choice should be supported as only the woman can really understand her 
circumstances.  The thinking that is done can be of any kind, as long as it occurs.  The thinking is 
the feminist act: yet what this thinking really ‘looks’ like or how one justifies a decision that 
upholds unequal gender relations (see author) is not explicated.  The thinking that is mentioned 
begins to look more like a lack of thought about one’s decision in terms of the feminist 
movement and women in general and more about individual needs and desires.  And when 
following a norm can make life easier – which name changing certainly can (see author) – it is 
understandable that that norm might be followed.  However, saying this is a feminist act is far 
more difficult to accept. 
 
                                                          
4
 In this way she reflects many of the women who changed their name in my wider study, who wished to be 
obviously a unit, team, or family. Though not discussed in detail on these sites – the correctness of the decision 
itself rather than the reasons for the decision being the main topic of debate – women in my wider study who 
changed names gave a number of reasons for doing so, which are given here to provide some context: display 
of love and commitment to the marriage, a sense of adulthood achieved through marriage and the status of 
being a ‘wife’, and being obviously and intelligibly a family by sharing a name with one’s husband, but also 
importantly one’s children (see Thwaites 2013a and 2013b for more on the reasons women gave for changing 
names).    
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More unusually, www.TheFeministBride.com has an entry by Katrina Majkut which advocates 
not changing names on marriage (Majkut, 18th May 2012).  She argues that there are historical and 
political reasons not to follow this pattern.  The discussions which follow this entry are initially 
in favour of Majkut’s philosophy, but quickly turn to disagreement by stating that all choices 
should be upheld.  The choice narrative becomes the dominant one in this comment thread and 
anyone suggesting that choice is not an acceptable answer to the question of name changing 
would have found it very difficult to be heard.  By suggesting that not upholding every woman’s 
decision, even if that decision follows a traditionally unequal path, is to suggest you are not 
supportive of your fellow feminists and are therefore not a ‘good’ feminist.  The choice narrative 
actually shuts down politically engaged debate and different viewpoints by encouraging everyone 
to act as they wish to and providing a justification with which is extremely hard to argue.  On 
each of these three websites it becomes clear that there is no obvious answer for feminists as to 
what to do for the best for themselves as individuals, as well as for women more widely – there 
is no agreement over the real significance of names - and in this situation – not wanting to blame 
a woman for her choices or suggest she is not a proper feminist – the individualised narrative of 
choice becomes incredibly significant.  When it is most difficult to decide ‘what to do for the 
best’, choice can appear to reconcile this difficulty with a notion of feminist politics: despite its 
actual de-politicising effect. 
 
On Feminist Wedding visitors are asked to fill in a short quiz about name changing created by the 
site editors in response to the debates sparked off by the question of what to do with one’s name 
on marriage.  The results show that most women who answered felt there was considerable 
pressure on women to change names, that they were irritated that it is seen as only a woman’s 
problem to grapple with, and that they were in the main going to keep their own name, but that 
they expected backlash for this decision.  The question which caused trouble was whether 
women who change names are making an anti-feminist choice.  Despite clear thoughts on the 
other questions with an easy majority one way, 30 percent of the women thought it was an anti-
feminist choice, 47 percent thought not and the remainder were unsure (results examined on the 
28th January 2013).  The comments on the websites reveal an equally mixed viewpoint on this 
question.  One www.TheFeministBride.com author found some support for her viewpoint in the 
comment discussion that women should not change names, but the idea of choice as more 
important than following a specific ‘standard feminist’ route quickly crept into the discussion of 
her article and became the dominant standpoint for those commenting. A 
www.ThePracticalWedding.com article has a long comments section following it in which 
feminists argue this point, showing how controversial the issue can be.  Ultimately though, most 
agree that feminism is about offering women choice and all decisions should be supported.  The 
feminist websites, helping women make decisions about living a feminist life-politics, ultimately 
come to the conclusion that choice feminism is the only way to deal with some of the incredible 
complexities which arise in living as a feminist in a non-feminist world.  Naming decisions are 
one example of this choice feminism, but it is an example of how judgement and debate over 
individual actions which actually impact other women’s decisions and selfhoods are silenced in 
the face of choice and individualism.   
 
 
 
Standards of Feminism: what does being a feminist mean? 
 
The silencing of other thoughts and opinions, reducing everything to uncritical ‘choice’, forces 
debate away from politics and into the realm of ‘unthinkingness’ (Shils, 1971, as everyone must 
follow the choice majority.  In fact, to not follow this majority is to be laid open to accusations 
of not being a ‘good’ feminist as one is not supporting women.  The complexity surrounding 
7 
 
what it means to be a feminist comes to the fore in these discussions, with naming choices a 
clear case of confusion over definition and lack of comfort in judging others, even when faced 
with the reality that a ‘choice’ may be detrimental to the woman herself.  Naming decisions are 
particularly open to choice feminist rhetoric.  To expound a complex argument to a loved one 
about their own name can feel like too much, that there are other, bigger battles, and that this is 
too intimate a decision to bring politics into.  It is also very difficult to discuss the patriarchal 
basis of name changing, which still exists in subtler forms than in previous centuries (see author), 
when most women changed their name. For feminists in particular this discussion is tricky: 
feminists are meant to understand the patriarchal basis of these kinds of traditions and hence to 
fight against them, so when a feminist friend changes her name any explanation other than free 
choice can be too difficult to face.  However, feminists find themselves complicit in non-feminist 
and anti-feminist decision-making at times – we are all embedded within our society and have 
desires to follow and find satisfaction in the norms which make people understandable and 
acceptable within that society.   
 
The name change is perhaps so particularly difficult and controversial a decision for feminists to 
make because of the association with feminism that keeping a name has.  Certain actions and 
beliefs are associated with feminism (Western feminism in this case, as the naming issue was 
important to British and American feminism particularly) and being critical of marriage, aware of 
the historical subjugation of women, and retaining one’s name are a part of this association.  This 
has been discussed briefly above but can be seen in my own research (see author) and in other 
smaller studies into feminists and naming decisions (see Mills, 2003).  A vocabulary of what it 
means to be a feminist today is created and name retaining can be seen as a ‘standard’ move.  In 
fact, in my research, the only time women who changed their name had to explicitly justify 
themselves to others was when they had to justify themselves to their feminist community (see 
author).  The difficulty that arises from having to articulate one’s seemingly non-feminist action 
within the context of a feminist community compels many women towards choice feminism, 
both to justify themselves and to help make more comfortable those they see having to justify 
themselves.  Justification depends on context, but choice feminism provides an easy route away 
from this uncomfortable moment and provides women with a sense of empowerment and 
agency in all their decision-making.   
 
The words ‘I made my own choice’ are, after all, very hard to argue with.  It also shifts the 
possibility of being a ‘bad’ feminist onto those who are more inclined to debate, and judgement 
of other choices becomes ‘nagging’, ‘judgmental’, and not supportive of one’s fellow feminists: in 
short, being labelled with words and phrases most feminists try to avoid as part of the clichéd, 
negative picture of feminism.  Choice is a strongly disciplining narrative (Thornton, 2010: 96); it 
encourages one in fact to make specific decisions and side with specific ways of being a feminist 
in order to remain open to everyone’s desires and actions, even if those may in fact seem 
detrimental to women as a wider grouping or even to just that woman herself.  Choice is 
therefore not as free as it initially sounds: choice feminism was just about women determining 
their lives it would be unproblematic, but the academic critiques of this part of the movement 
are compelling.  Making women more comfortable removes the need to interrogate deeply the 
motives behind following a traditional path connected with patriarchy; it also aligns feminism 
with neoliberalism and consumerism in a way which should make us all wary, and puts critique 
and judgement firmly into the ‘bad feminist’ box. It is important that academic and popular 
feminism inform one another and that there are not barriers to communicating critiques of the 
movement; it is only by doing so that we can move forward in our goal of creating political 
change.  Popular and academic feminism should not be separate entities but parts of a wider 
whole, yet the critiques of choice which academics debate are not represented on the websites 
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studied, suggesting something of a gap between the two narratives.  To unite popular and 
academic feminism choice feminism must be loudly challenged. 
 
 
Challenging Choice Feminism 
 
Choice is an important idea in discussions of late modernity and individualisation.  Anthony 
Giddens’ idea of the ‘reflexive project of the self’ (Giddens, 1996: 5) suggests that there are now 
more choices and options available to people than ever before; life trajectories are not bounded 
as they once were by traditions and rigid rule structures.  However this argument appears 
simplistic when thinking about how significant the past remains to decision-making and 
possibilities for action.  Individualisation theorists pit the past against the present (see Bauman, 
2011; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2010; Giddens, 1996): the past is presented as stable and 
unchanging, whereas the present is in constant flux.  This reductionist view of the past is in part, 
Vanessa May argues (2011: 365), because the past is viewed through its structures, whereas the 
present is viewed via personal lives: structures then easily appear unchanging, while our personal 
lives appear to be moving fluidly.  However, separating structures and personal life paints an 
unrealistic picture of the world, as structure and personal life – or society and self – are 
‘interdependent and permeable, each affected by the other’ (May, 2011: 365-366).  The past then, 
as Matthew Adams argues (2003: 227), influences us all through its ‘codes of practice’: structures 
and norms influencing personal life. 
 
Such ‘codes of practice’ become traditions and guide the decisions we make.  Traditions can 
become so embedded that they are ‘unthought’ and become so taken-for-granted that they need 
little or no justification for being followed.  The choice narrative ignores the very important 
place of unthinkingness within norms and traditions and that some seemingly freely made 
decisions are so influenced by societal practice and opinion that they cannot be considered truly 
free, in Giddens’ sense.  As Steven Lukes argues, some powerful social norms may be so 
ingrained that conceiving of other possibilities for action is practically impossible (2005: 113).  
Choices remain limited by the past, by resources, by the society in which a person lives, including 
the influences of the gender order and the ethical and moral standards of the day. The idea that 
women should be able to do whatever they want and makes them happy is a part of this 
narrative of reflexive choice; it is also a part of the pervasive neoliberal rhetoric which is so 
significant to modern capitalist societies.  Though neoliberalism, globalisation, and the impacts 
these systems have on the world are frequently presented by politicians and the mainstream 
media as inevitable forces – unstoppable in their linear progression – they are actually the 
consequences of human decisions and policies (Heron, 2008: 95).  These decisions have created 
vast inequalities but, as Taitu Heron argues (2008: 95), the ‘role of international and political 
economic structures and interests as co-determinants to poverty and continuing inequality is not 
recognized’.  Instead of investing in social equality and welfare, states look to solve problems 
through the market – and inequalities widen. 
 
The idea that we can improve our lives through consuming is an important force within 
neoliberal capitalism.  The consumer makes choices based on the idea of the consumer’s right to 
choose (Craven, 2007).  The consumer should be given a full range of choices and decide which 
is best for them.  Yet our choices are bounded, as I have argued.  Unthinkingness prevents 
certain thoughts or decisions for different courses of action from even arising.  A person may 
look as if they have made a totally free choice when in fact the powerful cultural norms at work 
can prevent ‘an agent or agents’ desires, purposes or interests […] [from being fulfilled] or even 
from being formulated’ (Lukes, 2005: 113).  Particular courses of action which are viewed as 
worthy or valuable and can even confer a certain status will shape action, encouraging people to 
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follow the norm to make their lives intelligible to others and viewed societally as valuable.  
Changing a name is one such norm, which is rarely questioned.  The unequal nature of this 
naming practice – women being expected to change names in a way men are not – continues to 
be deeply embedded in conceptions of the self and maintenance of inequalities between men and 
women.  It is incredibly difficult not to follow these norms, but when they perpetuate gendered 
inequalities feminists must take the time to interrogate them rather than finding ways of 
justifying them. 
 
Upholding all women’s decisions may seem like a feminist action in not belittling or talking 
down to other women, but it remains that feminists should be critical of the taken for granted 
norms which are unequally gendered and alert to the wider patriarchal context in which all 
decision-making is taken.  Choices are not entirely free, but the rhetoric of their being so is 
clearly highly important and influences societies across the globe.  Feminism has been involved 
with using the rhetoric of choice to attempt to improve the position of women.  Christa Craven 
points out that feminists called women making decisions about their reproductive rights 
‘consumers’ to attempt to get away from the generally paternalistic relationship with male 
doctors that women entered into on becoming pregnant: the female patient versus the male 
doctor (Craven, 2007: 701-702).  However liberating this narrative was intended to be, the use of 
‘choice’ by feminists within a neoliberal capitalist society must be constantly critiqued.  This 
neoliberal rhetoric of ‘choice’ is often invested in maintaining the status quo by removing the 
agency of the less powerful and enhancing that of the established powerful elite (Heron, 2008: 
95) who actually have the resources and means to make a wider range of choices than those who 
are disadvantaged.  The less powerful are then blamed by this rhetoric for not taking 
responsibility for themselves to make their lives better and more prosperous. 
 
This last point highlights the more dangerous side of individualism which creeps into these 
discussions, and which feminism can anchor itself to when critical discussion takes a back seat to 
embracing every decision.  Though the idea of everyone choosing to follow their own desires 
and achieve their own goals sounds freeing, it is, as Marso argues (2010: 264) an argument which 
ignores how choices and actions impact upon other people.  As she writes, ‘[f]or feminism to 
retain its political vision as a force for social justice, we must continue the difficult conversations 
concerning how acting on our diverse desires impacts the lives of others’ (Marso, 2010: 264).  
This negative individualism also encourages us as a feminist community to forget the differences 
in access to resources which are available to us, and which influence our ability to make choices.  
Furthermore it encourages us to blame ourselves as individuals when things go wrong rather 
than look critically at social norms and structures, and purports that any choice made freely by 
the individual cannot harm them, hence being unhappy or undermined by your choice can only 
be your own problem.  These are worrying statements to make in connection with feminism, a 
movement which should recognise systematic inequalities and work towards an equal society.  
Criticality is central to ensuring these important aims do not get lost in a narrative of neoliberal 
‘choice’. 
 
The power of the imagination is significant to thinking critically and opening up other 
possibilities: again, what courses of action we follow are in part influenced by whether or not we 
can even imagine them (Lukes, 2005: 113).  Michel De Certeau argues that ‘the thinkable […] is 
identified with what one can do’ (1988: 190.  Emphases in original).  In other words, if we can 
think it we believe we can do it.  Contrary to this, if we cannot think it we cannot do it – it takes 
being able to imagine an action first before it becomes a reality.  The unthinkingess that 
sometimes surrounds decision-making and the justifications we provide for those decisions 
should not go by accepted, but should be a challenge to all feminists to challenge themselves and 
others to be more creative and imaginative in their thinking.  Name changing is the prevalent 
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norm; name retaining is not so well articulated and with fewer examples and bureaucracy often 
discouraging it (see author), it can be harder to imagine as a possibility which is genuinely 
workable.  In seeing beyond the traditional and imagining a better and more equal society we 
open up the possibilities for action and change.  Unthinkingness is not feminist and this is 
something for us all to bear in mind. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Naming discussions reflect the growing importance of the choice narrative in feminism and the 
anxiety around what it means to be a feminist and how much and what kinds of judgement are 
acceptable.  Though there may be ‘standard feminist’ actions, such as keeping one’s birth name, 
judging others for following this particular path is unacceptable and evidence of ‘bad feminist’ 
practice by not supporting the decisions made by your fellow feminists.  Choice feminism strives 
to be inclusive, tolerant, and accepting.  However, and as scholarly feminist critique recognises, 
this narrative does a disservice to the feminist movement as a whole.  By forgoing discussion, 
debate, and measured judgement we shy away from engaging politically and critically with the 
unequally gendered world in which we live.  This is to shy away from the purpose of feminist 
action: to create change in our personal-political lives and those of other women.  By accepting 
all paths using the narrative of choice we effectively support patriarchal relations and norms.  It 
is difficult to judge others at times – and to turn a hard eye on our own selves – but without this 
kind of critique the movement becomes everything and nothing.  Starting with the seemingly 
personal decision of name changing and looking carefully at its political, historical, and gendered 
aspects is one such decision to question and critique.   
 
Academic and popular feminism need to speak to one another and inform one another to ensure 
critical conceptions of choice become more generally recognised. Choice feminism aligns itself 
with some dangerous and anti-feminist ideology, often completely without intention.  
Neoliberalism and individualism, as discussed in this article, discourage systematic change for 
better equality and silence discussion of how an individual fits within this system.  By claiming 
choice as the most significant feminist narrative, feminists claim this silencing, individualism, and 
market consumerism.  These are uncomfortable bedfellows for a movement dedicated to 
structural change, equality, and the opening of space for usually minority voices to speak.  
Significant to these discussions are unthinkingness and its opposite, imagination.  Avoiding 
uncritical unthinkingess around decision-making and justification will challenge us as a 
movement to be more creative and imaginative about what feminism is and can do.  The status 
quo maintaining choice feminism will no longer seem appealing if we open up our imaginations 
to what the world could look like if we critique, make political judgements, debate, discuss, and 
genuinely engage in the politics of making a better world.  
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